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Banking Law
SCOTT L. BAENA*
The author surveys recent Florida and federal responses,
both legislative and judicial, to current forces and trends in the
banking industry, including the soaring cost of money and its
conflict with state usury laws and regulation Q, the increasing
pressure for geographic expansion through merger and branch-
ing, the growing impact of international banking and foreign
investment on the domestic banking community, and the
emerging role of Florida as a money center.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida bankers and lawmakers alike were preoccupied with
soaring interest rates during calendar year 1979. When the cost of
*Partner in the firm of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, Miami, Florida.
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money exceeded the maximum rates chargeable to borrowers under
state usury laws, the Florida Legislature alleviated the situation, at
least temporarily, by increasing interest rate ceilings.' In addition,
Congress provided some relief by imposing a moratorium on usury
laws pertaining to residential mortgage loans.2 The point, however,
that arbitrary usury ceilings impede lenders' reactions to growth in
the money and credit markets has been dramatically driven home.
State legislatures may eventually recognize that they cannot con-
trol the cost of money with usury laws, for the effect of such laws is
to dry up credit altogether. Interest rate ceilings thus victimize the
same necessitous borrower they supposedly protect.'
The response of the Florida Legislature to the present credit
crisis reveals the ineffectiveness of usury laws. By setting usury
ceilings, the state is in effect trying to outdistance prime rates and
the Federal Reserve discount rate. Although it appears that money
and credit markets will stabilize, this stabilization may once again
be only temporary and a prelude to a new game of leap frog. The
shortcomings of the present usury laws suggest that the legislature
should soon consider repealing these statues, or at least tying
usury rates to the Federal Reserve discount rate.
On the other side of the coin, the movement to lift the ceilings
on interest paid on deposits gained momentum during 1979.4 Ironi-
cally, depositary institutions are also plagued by the rising cost of
money. It is their preference, of course, to lend funds generated by
deposits rather than borrow substantially more expensive federal
funds. Over the past twenty years, however, these institutions have
1. 1979 Fla. Laws chs. 79-138, -274, -592; see notes 17-36 and accompanying text infra.
2. Consumer Services and Usury Act, Pub. L. No. 96-161, § 106(a)(1)(A), 93 Stat. 1233
(1979); see notes 45-47 and accompanying text infra.
3. Miami News, Jan. 9, 1979, at 9A, col. 5. University of Florida economics professors
Robert Lanzillotti and Arnold Haggestadt, appearing before the House Commerce Commit-
tee on January 8, 1979, told the Committee that ceilings on loan interest rates harm the
consumers they are supposed to help, ultimately drying up credit by restricting profits of
lenders. Tight credit harms low-income high-risk borrowers who are the first to be turned
down by lending institutions, said the economists, who "called for all usury laws to be
junked." Committee members argued that the removal of interest rate ceilings would lead to
the exorbitant interest rates associated with loan sharks, as one legislator remarked that the
professors had "been to college too long." Id.
4. See [Current] FED. BANKING L. REP. (COH), Report Letter No. 789, at 2 (Nov. 15,
1979).
In a class action on behalf of senior citizens, various federal banking agencies were re-
quested to index savings deposit interest rates to the rate of inflation. In the alternative, the
class requested that notice be published in banking institutions warning that "savings ac-




suffered a severe deposit outflow, because money market rates
have generally exceeded controlled interest rates,5 enabling deposi-
tors to earn more elsewhere.
Those in favor of removing deposit interest rate ceilings argue
that such controls lead to disintermediation, 6 particularly with re-
spect to smaller institutions. In addition, ceilings result in a misal-
location of financial resources, subsidize borrowers at the expense
of savers, and retard competition by protecting marginal, ineffi-
cient competitors. Opponents of these efforts, on the other hand,
contend that the abrogation of interest rate controls will adversely
affect smaller, less profitable institutions which lack the means of
earning the extra funds to pay the higher interest required to com-
pete for depositors.8 Under the present system, however, the
smaller institutions face an even graver crisis in the prospect of
almost complete diminution of their deposit base. Bankers and de-
positors alike may reasonably view the 1979 amendments to regu-
lation Q9 as merely transitory and may look forward to more per-
manent relief from interest rate controls in the near future.10
Efforts to adopt statewide branch banking in Florida contin-
ued in 1979. The bank holding companies, however, were unable to
present a united front, leaving legislators to deal with numerous
alternative plans." As a result, the legislature enacted something
less than full statewide branching, providing that under certain cir-
cumstances, branches may be established by merger with any other
bank located in the state."
5. Address by William M. Isaac, Director of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
52d Annual Mid-Winter Meeting of the New York State Bankers Association, New York
City (Jan. 24, 1980) (on file University of Miami Law Review).
6. "Disintermediation refers to situations in which money that normally flows into
banks and other financial intermediaries flows directly to the users of the funds." H. CRossE
& G. HERNPEL, MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS, 113 (2d ed. 1973).
7. Address by William M. Isaac, supra note 5.
8. Miami News, Sept. 25, 1979, at 8A, col. 2. Senator Alan Cranston (D-Cal.), who led
the opposition to phasing out interest rate ceilings in the Senate Banking Committee, ar-
gued that the proposal to increase interest rates every year for 10 years would drive many
savings and loan institutions out of business, rather than solve the problems of the small
saver.
9. 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.0-.7 (1979).
10. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, DEPOSITORY INSTITU-
TIONS DEREGULATION Acr, S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT]. The report recommends that ceilings or maximum rates of interest on
deposits classified under regulation Q be increased by at least one-half of one percent each
year commencing January 1, 1982 and continuing until 1989, when all regulation Q author-
ity would expire. See notes 101-118 and accompanying text infra.
11. Miami News, May 21, 1979, at 10A, col. 2.
12. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-590, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 659.06 (1979)); see notes 66-
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More interesting were the efforts to gain legislative approval of
mergers between state bank holding companies and banks in seven
other southern states. Such interstate mergers would supposedly
enable local institutions to compete more effectively, through
larger loans and expanded services, with banks entering the state
from the principal money centers.18 Although proposed too late for
enactment in 1979, the bill indicates that Florida may finally be
ready to participate in an industrywide movement to remove geo-
graphic restraints on banking. Given the pressure to become a
money center and to associate with other money centers, forces
within the Florida banking industry will certainly continue to con-
centrate on geographic diversification.
For the 1980 legislative session, the spotlight will be focused
on the enactment of a new Banking Code to supersede the present
version, which will be automatically repealed in July 1980.1"
II. USURY LAWS
A. Amendments
In response to industry complaints that interest rate ceilings
were below prevailing money market rates, resulting in artificial al-
locations of credit and halting certain lending altogether, the 1979
Legislature enacted comprehensive amendments 5 to the various
state usury laws which generally increased interest rate ceilings.
Section 516.02 of the Florida Consumer Finance Act was
amended to increase the maximum amount of interest which unli-
censed lenders may charge on loans of up to $2500 from 10% per
annum to 18% per annum." Similarly, sections 516.18 and 516.21
were amended to increase to 18% the ceiling for consumer goods
loans and surety and guaranty loans.17 Section 516.031 was
71 and accompanying text infra.
13. Miami News, May 21, 1979, at 10A, col. 2. The proposal has been dubbed "the
Confederacy Amendment."
14. As of this writing, divergent versions of the new Banking Code have emerged in
each house of the Florida Legislature. Without lengthy deliberation, the Senate passed a
series of bills which together resemble the existing Code in that they treat each type of
licensed financial institution separately. On the other hand, the House Committee on Com-
merce has endeavored to produce an omnibus bill to govern all licensed financial institu-
tions. Both the Senate and House proposals are especially firm and precise in the area of
souid banking practices. Also, it appears that the House, like the Senate, will probably
impose further restrictions on the activities of foreign banks.
15. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-274.
16. Id. § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 516.02 (1977)).
17. Id. §§ 3, 4 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 516.18, .21 (1977)).
[Vol. 34:375
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amended to increase from 16% per annum to 18% per annum the
rate which may be charged by a licensed consumer finance com-
pany on that part of any loan exceeding $1000 which is secured by
land."8
The Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act was amended to increase
the permissible finance charge on retail installment sales of new
motor vehicles from $8 per $100 per year to $10 per $100 per year.
The new rate is the add-on equivalent of approximately 18% per
annum simple interest.19 In the case of sales under the Retail In-
stallment Sales Act, the amendments increase the permitted
finance charge from $10 per $100 per year to $12 per $100 per year,
or approximately 21.5% per annum simple interest." This increase
will presumably facilitate the sale of retail installment contracts to
finance companies.21
The amendments have substantially changed the usury provi-
sions governing industrial savings banks. Previously, these banks
could charge a discount of not more than 8% per annum upon the
total amount of a loan less than thirty-six months in duration, plus
an additional charge of not more than 2% of the principal amount
for investigative and other loan origination costs.'2 In the case of
loans exceeding thirty-six months, the discount, exclusive of addi-
tional charges, could not exceed the equivalent of 18% per annum
simple interest.2 The 1979 amendments, however, have deleted
the 8% maximum discount provision and created a maximum rate,
regardless of the duration of the loan, of "the equivalent of 18 per-
cent per annum simple interest.
2 4
Additionally, the 2 % charge for costs have been limited by the
amendments to a maximum of $50 and expressly apply the new
rate ceilings to unsecured as well as secured loans.2 The maximum
rate of interest on loans made by a credit union was also increased
18. Id. § 2 (amending FLA. STAT. § 516.031 (1977)).
19. Id. § 5 (amending FLA. STAT. § 520.08(1)(a) (1977)); see STAFF OF FLORIDA HousE
COMM. ON COMMERCE, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1262 at 2 (June 4, 1979) (on file Uni-
versity of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter cited as SUMMARY S.B. 1262].
20. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-274, § 6 (amending FLA. STAT. § 520.34 (1977)); see SUMMARY
S.B. 1262, supra note 19, at 2.
21. See SUMMARY S.B. 1262, supra note 19, at 2.
22. FLA. STAT. § 656.17(1) (1977) (amended 1979).
23. Id. § 656.17(1) (Supp. 1978) (amended 1979).
24. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-274, § 7 (amending FLA. STAT. § 656.17(1) (1977)). As in sub-
sequent sections of the bill, the term "equivalent" was used so as to allow any method of
computation, add-on or discount, as long as the result does not exceed 18% simple interest.
See SUMMARY S.B. 1262, supra note 19, at 3.
25. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-274, § 7 (amending FLA. STAT. § 656.17(1) (1977)).
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from 1 % a month to 1.5% a month on unpaid loan balances.2 6
With respect to small loans by commercial banks, the amend-
ments increased the allowable amount of such loans from $15,000
to $50,000 and deleted the 6% discount or add-on rate ceiling, sub-
stituting a ceiling of "the equivalent of 18 percent per annum sim-
ple interest. '27 The authorized 5% penalty has been extended to
defaults in interest as well as principal payments.2 Additional
charges for investigative and other origination costs;2' premiums
for collateral preservation and credit life insurance, 0 and fees or
taxes paid to public officials were also authorized."1
Finally, the general civil usury provisions were amended to in-
crease the interest ceiling on loans of $500,000 or less from 10%
per annum to "the equivalent of 18% per annum simple inter-
est."8 2 The interest ceiling on loans exceeding $500,000 was in-
creased from 15% per annum to 25% per annum simple interest,
the limit established by the criminal usury statute.33 The amend-
ments have eliminated the distinction between loans to individuals
and corporations.
3 4
As originally drafted, the amendments were limited to pro-
spective application." During the special session, however, the leg-
islature extended the amendments to loans, advances of credit or
lines of credit made prior to July 1, 1979, "if the lender has the
legal right to require full payment or to adjust or modify the inter-
est rate, by renewal, assumption, reaffirmation, contract, or
otherwise."38
In addition to increasing interest rate ceilings, the legislature
exempted from the civil usury laws certain loans made to alien
borrowers, where the loan is "clearly related to, and usual in, inter-
26. Id. § 8 (amending FLA. STAT. § 657.14 (1977)).
27. Id. § 9 (amending FLA. STAT. § 659.18(1) (1977)).
28. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 659.18(2)(a) (1977)).
29. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 659.18(2)(c) (1977)). These charges may not exceed the
lesser of $50 or two percent of the principal amount of the loan.
30. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 659.18(2)(b), (d) (1977)).
31. Id. (adding FLA. STAT. § 659.18(2)(e) (1977)).
32. Id. §§ 12, 13 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 687.02, .03(1) (1977 & Supp. 1978)).
33. FLA. STAT. § 687.071(2) (1979).
34. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-274, §§ 12, 13 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 687.02, .03(1) (1977 &
Supp. 1978)).
35. Id. § 15.
36. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-592, § 1 (amending 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-275, § 15). In other
wordsc, credit arrangements entered prior-to-the-amendments -that could be subject to some




national or foreign business.''8 The exemption does not, however,
extend to the criminal usury laws, which thus continue to provide
a 25% per annum ceiling on such transactions.3 8 This exemption,
like the exemption of similar transactions from documentary
stamp taxes,3 9 is intended to remove former impediments to the
growth of international financing transactions in Florida. The ex-
emptions should accord Florida lenders competitive equality with
lenders in other jurisdictions, to which such transactions are pres-
ently diverted in an effort to avoid Florida usury laws.40
The 1979 amendments provide a "good faith" defense for
lenders that discover a usurious overcharge and rectify it.41 Prior
usury law penalties, provided for forfeiture of all interest charged,
not merely the usurious portion. This penalty applied even if the
lender, prior to the borrower's suit or defense under the statute,
sought to rebate the usurious overcharge and retroactively adjust
the interest on the obligation. Thus, it was theoretically more ad-
vantageous for the lender to remain silent rather than alert the
borrower, hoping that the usurious overcharge would never be dis-
covered.42 Under new subsection 687.04(2), however, the penalty
does not apply to a lender that notifies its borrower of a usurious
overcharge and refunds the amount of such overcharge plus inter-
est thereon at the maximum lawful rate.48 The lender must do so,
however, prior to the filing of an action or defense by the borrower
charging usury, or receipt by the lender of written notice from the
borrower that usury has been charged or collected."
B. Federal Legislation
In response to the unavailability of credit due to the cost of
37. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-138, § I (codified at FLA. STAT. § 687.13 (1979)). The exemp-
tion applies to loans made by any international bank agency or any bank, including an Edge
Act corporation, organized under federal or Florida law.
38. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 687.071 (1979); STAF OF FLORIDA HOUSE COMM. ON COMMERCE,
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF H.B. 1698 at 1 (June 5, 1979) (on file University of Miami Law
Review).
39. FLA. STAT. § 201.23(1)(a), (b) (1979).
40. Baena & Romanchuck, Banking Law, 1977 Developments in Florida Law, 32 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 763, 769 (1978).
41. STAFF O FLORIDA HOUSE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF H.B.
1496 at 3 (May 23, 1979) (on file University of Miami Law Review). This staff summary
suggests that the new subsection closely parallels a provision of the Federal Truth in Lend-
ing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(b) (1976).
42. Id.
43. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-90, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 687.04 (1977)).
44. Id.
1980]
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money soaring beyond state interest rate ceilings, Congress enacted
the Consumer Services and Usury Act,"5 which imposed a morato-
rium on the application of such laws to any loan secured by a first
lien on residential real property. The moratorium applied to loans
made in any state until March 31, 1980, unless prior to that time
the state reinstated limitations on interest chargeable on such
loans."" Residential mortgage loans, or commitments to lend, made
prior to the expiration date of the Act continue to be subject to the
Act after expiration and are beyond the reach of state usury laws.
7
The Act also amended the National Bank Act,4' the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act," the National Housing Act5o and the Small
Business Investment Act of 19581 to increase the interest charge-
able on business and agricultural loans of $25,000 or more. The
amendments permit interest in the amount of 5% in excess of the
discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Fed-
eral Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district where the bank,
institution or small business investment company is located. 2
These measures were to remain in effect until July 1, 1980, unless
the state adopted a law or its voters endorsed a referendum stating
in substance that the state preferred that the federal amendments
not apply to loans made in the state."
C. Interest Rate Parity
The usefulness of the Florida Interest Rate Parity Law, 4
which equalizes interest rates chargeable by the various types of
lending institutions, may have been limited by the 1979 usury law
amendments, which have the same effect. Rather than repeal the
parity statute, however, the legislature authorized an in depth
45. Pub. L. No. 96-161, § 105(a)(1), 93 Stat. 1233 (1979).
46. Id. § 105(b).
47. Id. § 105(d).
48. Id. § 201 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976)).
49. Id. § 202 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (1976)).
50. Id. § 203 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1730(e) (1976)).
51. Id. § 204 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 687(h) (1976)).
52. Id. §§ 201-205.
53. Id. § 207.
54. FLA. STAT. § 687.12(1) (1979) provides, inter alia, that any lender or creditor li-
censed or chartered under federal law or selected provisions of Florida law may extend
credit "at the maximum rate of interest permitted by law to be charged on similar loans or
extensions of credit made by any lender or creditor in the State of Florida," except that the
maxifiium interest ceilings for all loans, as well as other statutes governing the amount,
term, permissible charges, rebate requirements, and restrictions for similar loans, remain
applicable to the transaction.
[Vol. 34:375
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study of its operation and effect by the Department of Banking
and Finance, which was required to report its findings by March 1,
1980.5
As long as the parity statute remains in force, however, it is
arguable that state and national banks in Florida may make the
same type of mortgage loans as savings and loan associations and
be eligible for the usury law exemption now enjoyed by those as-
sociations,56 provided that the bank loans comply with the restric-
tions of the Savings Association Act.57 But this argument remains
academic as long as the federal moratorium on the application of
state usury laws to residential mortgage loans is effective.58
D. Spreading Statute
In Hamm v. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co.," the District
Court of Appeals, Second District, construed the language of the
"spreading" statute,0 which provides that in computing the effec-
55. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-274, § 16.
56. FLA. STAT. § 665.395 (1979) provides:
No fines, interest or premiums paid on loans made by any building and loan
association shall be deemed usurious, and the same may be collected as debts of
like amount are now collected by law in this state, and according to the terms
and stipulations of the agreement between the association and the borrower.
The Supreme Court of Florida recently concluded that state and federal savings and
loan associations were exempt from the usury laws under this provision. See Catogas v.
Southern Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 369 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1979). See also Florida Bankers
Ass'n, Legal Bull. No. 79-1 (Mar. 5, 1979) (on file University of Miami Law Review). Bank
enjoyment of this usury exemption through the parity statute, however, would conflict with
that statute's subordination to maximum interest rate ceilings. See FLA. STAT. § 687.12(1)
(1979).
57. FLA. STAT. §§ 665.011-.717 (1979).
58. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
59. 379 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
60. FLA. STAT. § 687.03(3) (1979) provides, inter alia:
For the purpose of this chapter, the rate of interest on any loan of money shall
be determined and computed upon the assumption that the debt will be paid
according to the agreed terms, whether or not said loan is paid or collected by
court action prior to the term of said loan, and any payment or property
charged, reserved, or taken as an advance or forbearance, which is in the nature
of, and taken into account in the calculation of, interest shall be valued as of the
date received and shall be spread over the stated term of the loan for the pur-
pose. of determining the rate of interest. The spreading of any such advance or
forbearance for the purpose of computing the rate of interest shall be calculated
by first computing the advance or forbearance as a percentage of the total stated
amount of the loan. This percentage shall then be divided by the number of
years, and fractions thereof of the loan according to its stated maturity date,
without regard to early maturity in the event of default. The resulting- annual
percentage rate shall then be added to the stated annual percentage rate of in-
terest to produce the effective rate of interest for purposes of this chapter.
19801
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tive rate of interest under the usury laws, other charges in the na-
ture of interest shall be spread over the stated term of the loan
regardless of acceleration." The bank had loaned Hamm $290,000
for two years at a stated annual interest rate of 9% on July 21,
1973,"2 receiving at that time a 2% "commitment fee" of $5800.
When the bank sued to foreclose, Hamm asserted usury as a de-
fense, arguing that the fee had reduced the actual principal sum
received to $284,200. The usury statute thus permitted the bank to
charge a maximum of $56,840 as interest, but Hamm was obligated
to repay $58,000 including the fee, in addition to the $284,200
received.s
The bank sought summary judgment, arguing that even if the
fee were in the nature of interest, the total effective rate of interest
as calculated under the spreading statute did not exceed the 10%
ceiling. The bank first computed the fee ($58,000) as a percentage
of the total stated amount of the loan ($290,000), yielding 2%,
which was then divided by the term of the loan (two years) and
added to the stated annual percentage rate of interest (9%), pro-
ducing a total effective rate of interest of 10% ." The court held
that summary judgment under the above rationale was improper,
concluding that the spreading statute applied only in those cases
in which the debt had been accelerated, and that in this case, the
loan had not been accelerated. If in fact the fee were in the nature
of interest, then Hamm was correct and the loan was usurious on
its face at an effective interest rate of 10.204%. But the court also
61. 379 So. 2d at 1305.
62. The spreading statute, enacted in 1977, was found to apply retroactively to this
1973 loan, since usury statutes involve remedies and create no substantive rights. The court
found that a prospective application clause in-subsection 2(b) did not limit subsection 3. Id.
at 1302.
63. The court held that "the ultimate test for usury is always whether the debtor is
required to pay back an amount which exceeds what he actually received plus interest on
that amount at the maximum annual rate computed over the length of loan." Id. at 1304.
The maximum 10% interest rate applicable in the Hamm case was subsequently raised to
"the equivalent of 18 percent per annum simple interest." 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-274, § 13
(amending FLA. STAT. § 687.03(1) (1977)).
The court noted that the advance retention of interest at the maximum rate was cus-
tomarily not considered usurious in many jurisdictions in the case of short term notes less
than one year in duration, even though the retention effectively reduced the amount actu-
ally received below the face amount of the note. 379 So. 2d at 1303-04; see Annot., 57
A.L.R.2d 630 (1958).
64. The bank's computation under FLA. STAT. § 687.03(3) (1979), using the face amount
of the note for the total stated amount of the loan, was initially persuasive with the Second
District, which affirmed the summary judgment for the bank. 1979 FLA. L. WEEKLY 1200 (2d
DCA July 18, 1979), rev'd per curiam, 379 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
[Vol. 34:375
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noted that the spreading statute yielded identical results, because
the "[sltated amount of the loan should not be equated with 'face
amount of the note,' but rather with 'actual principal sum re-
ceived.' ,,65 This reading of the statute clearly encroaches upon leg-
islative prerogative, as the court sought to avoid the theoretically
harsh result to debtors of applying the statute as written.
III. GEOGRAPHIC RESTRAINTS ON BANKING
A. Statewide Bank Mergers
Although statewide branching legislation was again foiled in
Florida, a compromise bill was enacted in the 1979 special session
which would permit any state bank to establish branches by
merger with any other bank located in the state.6 The only restric-
tion imposed is that a bank incorporated for less than three years
may not merge with a bank located in another county. 7 Under the
new law, the acquiring bank may also, with the approval of the
Department of Banking and Finance, establish two new branches
per year in the county in which it created a branch by merger."
Opponents charge that the new law brings the state closer to
full statewide branch banking," but, the measure may have little
real impact on the industry. Florida's experience under countywide
branching has been that few holding companies have taken advan-
tage of the 1977 legislation. 70 The reasons for their reluctance in-
clude the pricing problems of operating one bank in two markets,
personnel displacement and the burden of Federal Reserve mem-
bership where one of the merging banks is a member bank and the
other a nonmember.7 1 These deterrents would seem to be equally
65. 379 So. 2d at 1305 n.6 (emphasis in original). The court was persuaded to adopt this
construction on rehearing by a hypothetical offered by Hamm in which half the face amount
of the loan was retained by the lender as an additional interest charge without violating the
spreading statute as interpreted by the bank. Id. at 1303. "[W]e do not believe that the
legislature could have intended for its statute to be read in such a way as would permit the
outcome portrayed in the hypothetical." Id. at 1304.
66. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-590, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 659.06(1)(a)1 (1979)). Such
mergers require the approval of the Department of Banking and Finance upon a determina-
tion that the resulting bank will be of sound financial condition. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. The Department is to prescribe conditions for the establishment of intracounty
branches, including a showing by the bank that public convenience and necessity will be
served thereby.
69. Miami News, May 31, 1979, at 11A, col. 1. Opponents of the measure fear that the
escalation-of- statewide branch-banking-may drive smalltown banks out of business.
70. FLA. STAT. § 659.06(1)(a)1 (1977) (amended 1979).
71. Parker, Update on Florida Bank Branching, 64 ECON. REV. (FED. REs. BANK OF
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applicable to the statewide merger concept.
B. Loan Production Offices
"Loan production office" is a generic term generally used to
describe a banking facility which acts as a liaison with the main
banking house in the referral and servicing of loans.
Presently, Florida law would seem to proscribe the establish-
ment of loan production offices in the state by foreign banks;
72
however, there have been efforts to change that policy.73 Those ef-
forts have not as yet been successful, as bankers and legislators
continue to equate loan production offices with interstate branch-
ing. Proponents argue that the concerns of smaller banks are
groundless with respect to the entry of money center institutions
into Florida through loan production offices, because there is little
market overlap with such smaller banks. Loan production offices
are primarily intended to service large business accounts and thus
would probably compete only with the larger banks in the urban
centers of the state.7 '
The automatic response of bankers and legislators to loan pro-
duction offices spread to the courts in Independent Bankers Asso-
ciation of America v. Heimann.75 A bankers' group (IBAA) chal-
lenged an interpretive ruling which sanctioned the establishment
of loan production offices by national banks. The challenged rul-
ing,7 promulgated by the defendant Comptroller of the Currency,
ATLANTA) 34 (1979).
The prospect for enactment of full statewide branching in the near future may also
deter holding companies from utilizing the limited 1977 provisions. For a discussion of re-
luctance due to other factors, see Goeller, Response to Countywide Branching: The New
Chapter in Florida Banking, 62 ECON. Rov. (FED. -Rs. BANK OF ATLANTA) 144 (1977).
72. FLA. STAT. § 659.57 (1979). See generally Baena & Murray, Banking Law, 1978 De-
velopments in Florida Law, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 757, 777-86 (1979).
73. Memorandum from Cyrus E. Hornsby, III to Banking Committee-Corporate,
Banking and Business Section-The Florida Bar (Jan. 10, 1979) (on file University of
Miami Law Review).
74. J. Guttentag, Branch Banking, Interstate Branching, and Loan Production Offices:
Analysis of the Issues, 15-16 (May 1979) (occasional paper, ISBN 0-916770-10-9, Law and
Economics Center, University of Miami School of Law).
75. No. 78-0811 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 1979) (on file University of Miami Law Review).
76. Interpretive Ruling, 12 C.F.R. § 7.7380(b) (1979) provides:
Origination of loans by employees or agents of a national bank or of a subsidiary
corporation at locations other than the main office or a branch office of the bank
does not violate 12 U.S.C. 36 and 81: Provided, That the loans are approved and
made at the main office or a branch office of the bank or at an office of the
subsidiary located on the premises of, or contiguous to, the main office or branch
office of the bank.
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permitted national banks to originate loans at locations other than
main banking or branch offices, provided that the loans were "ap-
proved and made" at the main banking or branch office." The
IBAA contended that the ruling gave national banks a competitive
advantage over state banks because it exempted loan production
offices from compliance with state and federally imposed branch-
ing restrictions.s
The court agreed, concluding that loan production offices are
branches within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 36(f),7 1 since they pro-
vide all essential services connected with obtaining loans except
disbursement and approval, which is easily communicated by tele-
phone from the main or branch banking office.80 "Thus, a prospec-
tive loan applicant may go to [a loan production office], complete
the necessary paperwork, and subsequently receive the loan pro-
ceeds through the mail without ever going to a main or a branch
bank office."81 Accordingly, the court ordered the Comptroller to
rescind the challenged ruling, declaring it "null and void." 2
IV. INTERNATIONAL BANKING
A. Revisions to Section 659.67
When Florida's International Banking Law 3 was first enacted,
no distinction was drawn between international bank agencies and
representative offices in requiring that the assets of the interna-
tional banking corporation exceed its liabilities by at least twenty-
five million dollars. Indeed, the Department of Banking and Fi-
77. Id.
78. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1976) provides, inter alia:
A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the
Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the limits of the city,
town or village in which said association is situated, if such establishment and
operation are at the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the
State in question; and (2) at any point within the State in which said association
is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time authorized to
State banks . . . , and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the
law of the State on State banks.
79. 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1976) defines the term "branch" to include "any branch bank,
branch office, branch agency, additional office, or any branch place of business located in
any State or Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia at which deposits
are received, or checks paid, or money lent."
80. No. 78-0811, slip op. at 4.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. FLA. STAT. § 659.67 (1977) (amended 1979).
84. Id. § 659.67(5)(a)5.
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nance indicated at that time that it would impose the minimum
net worth requirements on applicants seeking to establish only a
representative office.85 On the other hand, substantial differences
between the activities which may be conducted by agencies as op-
posed to representative offices86 make such "equal treatment" il-
logical, a deterrent to the establishment of representative offices.
Recognizing the harshness of the original statute, the Department
sponsored and the Legislature enacted an amendment reducing the
minimum net worth requirement for representative offices to ten
million dollars. 7
In competition with the lure of the Federal International
Banking Act of 1978,88 the legislature further amended Florida's
counterpart statute to permit an international bank agency to
"make any loan or investment or exercise any power which it could
make or exercise if it were operating in this state as a federal
agency." 8' More significantly, the Comptroller of Florida amended
the rules governing these activities of international banking corpo-
rations to create "competitive equality" with federally chartered
institutions. Pursuant to the amendments, effective February 25,
1980, the operations of international banking agencies
may be conducted with the same rights and privileges as a state
bank including, but not limited to, maintaining credit balances
incidental to or arising out of the exercise of its banking powers,
paying checks and lending money, except that it shall not ex-
ercise fiduciary powers or accept deposits from any person who
is a citizen of or who resides, is domiciled, or maintains its prin-
cipal place of business in, the United States.90
As a consequence, international banking agencies may now accept
deposits from non-United States sources and make any loan that a
state bank can make. It appears that domestic banks either do not
85. See Baena & Romanchuck, supra note 40, at 769.
86. FLA. STAT. § 659.67(1)(c) (1979) defines an international bank agency as "the inter-
national banking corporation with respect to all business or activities conducted in this state
or through an office located in this state." In contrast, a representative office acts "in a
liaison capacity with existing and potential customers of such international banking corpo-
ration and to generate new loans and other activities for such international banking corpora-
tion which is operating outside of the state." Id. § 659.67(1)(d) (emphasis added). Subsec-
tion 11 is equally restrictive: "No representative office shall conduct banking business in this
state." FLA. STAT. § 659.67(11) (1979).
87. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-145, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 659.67(5)(a)5 (1977)).
88. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3101-3108 (West Supp. 1979).
89. FLA. STAT. § 659.67(6)(f (1979).




perceive their loan market to be in jeopardy or welcome the com-
petition; since the amendments did not generate any objections
during the comment period.9 1
Further to dull any competitive edge federal agencies may
have under the International Banking Act of 1978,91 the Florida
Legislature elected the option under that statute of prohibiting the
establishment within the state of an international banking agency
as a "state branch" or a "federal branch."9
B. International Banking Act Rules
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has issued regula-
tions and rules implementing the International Banking Act of
1978,9" which provides that federal branches which receive deposits
of $100,000 or less must be insured unless the Comptroller of the
Currency determines by order or regulation that the activities of
the branch do not require insurance.9 Under the new regulations,
a state branch of a foreign bank may be exempted from the insur-
ance requirement if its acceptance of initial deposits under
$100,000 is limited to deposits of commercial concerns organized
outside the United States, deposits of governmental units and in-
ternational organizations, and deposits evidenced by drafts and
checks issued by the branch." An exempted branch must, however,
notify its depositors that their funds are not insured. 7
The FDIC has also announced that it will not insure deposits
in any state or federal branch of a foreign bank unless every
branch located in the same state also becomes an-insured branch,
but this rule will not apply to any branch which accepts only initial
deposits in an amount of $100,000 or more.98
More importantly, the new regulations establish pervasive re-
porting requirements for foreign banks that operate insured state
91. Telephone conversation with William Limon, Staff Counsel, Department of Bank-
ing and Finance (Feb. 13, 1980).
92. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3101-3108 (West Supp. 1979).
93. FLA. STAT. § 659.67(6)(g) (1979); see 12 U.S.C.A. § 3103(a)(1)(A), (2)(A) (West
Supp. 1979).
A "state branch" is a branch of a foreign bank established and operating under the laws
of any state, while a "federal branch" is established and operates under § 3102 of the federal
statute. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3101(6), (12) (West Supp. 1979).
94. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3101-3108 (West Supp. 1979).
95. Id. § 3104(a).
96. 44 Fed. Reg. 40,060, 40,061 (1979) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 346.6).
97. Id. (to be codified at § 346.7).
98. Id. at 40,060 (to be codified at § 346.3).
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or federal branches.99 The bank must agree to provide the FDIC
with information regarding activities of the bank and its affiliates
which are carried on outside the United States, allow the FDIC to
examine all offices of the bank and its affiliates within the United
States and pledge assets to the FDIC which are worth at least 10%
of the average of the insured branch's liabilities for the last thirty
days of the calendar quarter. 00
V. AMENDMENTS TO REGULATION Q
Regulation Q101 prescribes the maximum rates of interest per
annum payable by a member bank of the Federal Reserve System
on time and savings deposits. 0 2 In an effort to alleviate the grow-
ing disparity between these interest rates and money market rates,
the Federal Reserve Board raised the ceiling on deposit interest to
51/ % for commercial banks and to 51/2 % for savings banks. 03
In addition, the early withdrawal provisions of regulation Q
were amended so that the present penalty of three months interest
and payment of interest on the funds withdrawn at the passbook
rate will only apply to time deposits made before July 1, 1979.
Thereafter, the minimum penalty will be loss of six months' inter-
est on deposits maturing in more than one year, and loss of three
months' interest on deposits maturing in one year or less.0 4
An interpretation of regulation Q was also adopted permitting
member banks to accept funds pooled by investors, thereby facili-
tating deposits by consortiums of larger sums at higher rates of
interest.1 In a related development, however, the Securities and
Exchange Commission has stated that it "is unable to conclude
that it will not recommend" enforcement action against banks
which offer participation in large certificates of deposit without
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933106 registration
requirements.
10 7
This problem may now be academic, however, since the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Fed-
99. Id. at 40,062 (to be codified at § 346.17).
100. Id. (to be codified at § 346.19).
101. 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.0-.7 (1979).
102. Id. § 217.7.
103. 44 Fed. Reg. 32,648 (1979) (amending 12 C.F.R. § 217.7(c) (1979)).
104. 44 Fed. Reg. 46,435 (1979) (amending 12 C.F.R. § 217.4(d) (1979)).
105. 44 Fed. Reg. 32,353 (1979) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 217.155(b)).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (1976).
107. 31 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) A-8 (Aug. 6, 1979). But see Drovers Bank v. SFC Corp.,
452 F. Supp. 580 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
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eral Deposit Insurance Corporation have each approved'"8 a "loop-
hole" savings deposit plan. 109 This plan enables depositors with
less than the $10,000 minimum needed to purchase money market
certificates to borrow the balance from the issuing bank at a rate of
one percent in excess of the certificate rate. 10 The only condition
imposed is that a bank must disclose in its advertisements the fact
that it is necessary to borrow funds to achieve a stated return."'
The loophole plan has not been adopted by the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, which has criticized the plan as a "circumven-
tion of rate control regulations" and, in at least one instance, has
demanded that the practice be discontinued.'
1 2
The Federal Reserve Board also adopted several other house-
cleaning amendments to regulation Q. One requires a bank to pay
a time deposit before maturity without penalty if the depositor
dies and a representative or other owner requests withdrawal.'
Another amendment extends this payment without penalty re-
quirement to a depositor who is declared mentally incompetent.",4
Previously, banks, at their discretion, could pay all or a portion of
the time deposit before maturity, with or without penalty. That
rule will continue with respect to time deposits issued before July
1, 1979. 11
In the future, the attention of the industry will be on the pro-
posed Depository Institutions Deregulation Act" 6 which would
eventually abrogate regulation Q altogether. Under the proposal,
beginning on January 1, 1982 and each succeeding January 1
through January 1, 1989, the maximum rate of interest on each
category of deposits established under regulation Q would be in-
creased by at least one-half of one percent.17 On January 1, 1990,
all regulation Q authority would expire, although the Federal Re-
108. Approval did not come through traditional regulatory action, but was given in let-
ters sent to Representative Benjamin Rosenthal (D-N.Y.), Chairman of the House Govern-
ment Operations Monetary Affairs Subcommittee. 48 U.S.L.W. 2235 (Oct. 2, 1979).
109. See 37 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) A-6 (Sept. 24, 1979).
110. 48 U.S.L.W. at 2235.
111. [Current] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) Report Letter No. 781, at 1 (Sept. 20,
1979).
112. Miami News, Sept. 21, 1979, at 8A, col. 1; cf. 37 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) A-6 (Sept.
24, 1979) (Federal Home Loan Bank of Cincinnati considers plan violative of bank
regulations).
113. 44 Fed. Reg. 46,436 (1979) (amending 12 C.F.R. § 217.4(d) (1979)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. H.R. 4986, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); see SENATE REPORT, supra note 10.
117. H.R. 4986, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107(b)(1) (1979).
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serve would retain standby authority to reimpose rate controls." 8
VI. OWNERSHIP OF STATE BANKS
A. Fingerprints
Revisions to the Florida Banking Code have strengthened the
investigative capabilities of banking regulators. All organizers, pro-
posed directors, and chief executive, officers, and each person sub-
scribing to five percent or more of the voting stock of a state bank
for which a charter is sought, must submit a complete set of finger-
prints to the Department of Banking and Finance."" Proposed
new owners or owners of the controlling stock in corporations seek-
ing to acquire control of an existing bank or trust company must
comply with this requirement as well.' 20
B. Citizenship of Directors
The requirement that all directors of state banks be citizens of
the United States during their term has been relaxed. The amend-
ment provides that not less than a majority of the directors be citi-
zens during their term of service."" This revision represents a clas-
sic balancing of interests, weighing the concern over expansion of
foreign banks into the United States market and the possibility of
foreign domination against the desire in states such as Florida to
boost a sagging economy with foreign funds. At present, Florida is
cautiously encouraging foreign infusions.
VII. SHARE DRAFTS, AUTOMATIC TRANSFER ACCOUNTS AND
REMOTE SERVICE UNITS
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has con-
cluded in American Bankers Association v. Connell"' that the va-
rious regulatory agencies have no authority to authorize automatic
transfer accounts," as remote service units"4 or share drafts."25 The
118. Id. § 107(b)(2).
119. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-144, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 659.02 (1979)).
120. Id. § 2 (amending FLA. STAT. § 659.14 (1979)).
121. Id. ch. 79-53 (amending FLA. STAT. § 659.11(2) (1979)).
122. 47 U.S.L.W. 2686 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, 1979), vacating per curiam 447 F. Supp. 296
(D.D.C.) and 463 F. Supp. 342 (D.D.C. 1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 240 (1979) (full memo-
randum opinion on file University of Miami Law Review).
123. Automatic transfer accounts, as authorized by the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System in 43 Fed. Reg. 20,001 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 217.5(c)(2),
(3)), permit withdrawals to be made automatically from a savings deposit through payment
to the bank itself or through transfer of credit to a demand deposit. The court found the
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effectiveness of the court's order vacating the challenged regula-
tions was stayed until January 1, 1980, in the expectation that
Congress would respond legislatively to the policy questions
raised.' 26  After considerable dickering, Congress finally enacted
emergency legislation postponing the proscription of the court un-
til March 31, 1980.127 Permanent approval of these programs is in-
corporated in the Depository Institutions Deregulation Act,
128
which may eventually wind its way through Congress. As these
programs have become well entrenched in the industry and have
been instrumental in providing consumers with more competitive
and efficient banking services, they should be continued. 129
On the state level, similar legislation proposed by the Depart-
ment of Banking and Finance would amend section 665.341 of the
Florida Statutes " to permit transfers, by a negotiable or transfer-
able order, of money deposited in a state savings association, as
automatic transfer account to be an indirect device for the payment of interest on a demand
deposit, as prohibited by 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1976). Similarly, the automatic fund transfer
system authorized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 43 Fed. Reg. 20,222
(1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 329.5(c)(2)) was held to be in violation of 12 U.S.C. §
1828(g) (1976), which directs the Board of Directors of the FDIC to prohibit the payment of
interest on demand deposits. The automatic fund transfer system also effectively violated 12
U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1301, 92 Stat. 3712 (1978),
which provides that, except in seven New England states, withdrawals from savings ac-
counts may not be made negotiable or transferable instruments for the purpose of making
transfers to third parties. See 47 U.S.L.W. at 2686; memorandum opinion at 2 & n.1.
124. Remote service units had been established by savings and loan associations "pur-
suant to Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations (12 C.F.R. § 545.4-2 (1978)) which
permit the withdrawal of funds from an interest-bearing time deposit account by a device
functionally equivalent to a check." Memorandum opinion at 2. The court found this proce-
dure to be in violation of the prohibition against checking accounts in § 5(b)(1) of the Home
Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1) (1976). See 47 U.S.L.W. at 2686.
125. Share drafts, authorized by the National Credit Union Administration in 12 C.F.R.
§ 701.34 (1978), are used as a means of withdrawing savings from federal associations and
credit unions by drafting upon the account. Until the affected account is drafted against, it
continues to earn interest. The court found that the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. §§
1751-1790 (1976), did not contain an express grant of power to offer share drafts, nor could
such power be implied in view of the legislative history. See memorandum opinion at 2, n.2.
126. 47 U.S.L.W. at 2686.
127. Consumer Services and Usury Act, Pub. L. No. 96-161, § 105(b), 93 Stat. 1233
(1979).
128. H.R. 4986, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
129. See Karr, Share Drafts and the Draft Issue, 12 U.C.C. L.J. 65 (1979).
130. FLA. STAT. § 665.341 (1979) limits the withdrawal of funds from savings associa-
tions, providing that a savings account member may file no more than one written applica-
tion for withdrawal at a time. Savings associations may elect at any time to pay each and
every such application in full as presented; otherwise, applications of $200 must be paid in
the order prescribed by a statutory rotation system.
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well as amend chapter 657 to authorize credit union share drafts.'
VIII. CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT
The most significant but troublesome case of the year was Cit-
izens National Bank v. Bornstein.3' In November 1973, Milford
Mechanical Corporation ("Milford") purchased a $13,000 certifi-
cate of deposit from Citizens National Bank of Orlando, now
known as Pan American Bank of Orlando, N.A. ("Bank"). Previ-
ously indebted to the Bank for $250,000, Milford executed a signa-
ture card containing a standard clause providing that the certifi-
cate could be set off by the Bank against any such indebtedness.
The certificate stated on its face: "This certificate is assignable
only with the consent of and on the books of the [Bank]."' The
following language appeared on the reverse side:"ASSIGNMENT
(Effective only when recorded on the books of the bank)."' 84 In
December 1973, Milford assigned the certificate to National In-
demnity Company of Omaha ("National") as collateral for the
purchase of a construction bond. National thereafter typed in a
similar assignment form on the reverse of the certificate and as-
signed it to Barbara Bornstein as trustee of National.
No evidence was adduced that the Bank was notified of either
assignment or that it had consented thereto. Indeed, in March
1974, the Bank paid interest on the certificate directly to Milford,
which endorsed and deposited the interest check. Notice of the as-
signments first came on April 22, 1974, when the Bank received the
certificate with a letter requesting payment to Bornstein. One week
later, the Bank set off the funds represented by the certificate
against Milford's $250,000 debt and refused payment to Bornstein,
who then brought suit.
The district court ruled for Bornstein, concluding that "the
bank is not in a position as to the issued [sic] involved in this case
to raise as a defense the defect in the manner in which the assign-
ment was sought to be effected by Milford .... "135 As for the
131. See Sadler & Walters, Effects of Competition on Banking Law in the 1980's, 54
FLA. B.J. 36 (1980). Share drafts were found to be a proper incidental power of Florida
chartered credit unions in Florida Bankers Ass'n v. Leon County Teachers Credit Union,
359 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
132. 606 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1979).
133. 564 F.2d 721, 722 (5th Cir. 1977).
134. Id.
135. Bornstein v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, No. 74-202, slip op. at 6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12,
1975) (on file University of Miami Law Review).
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lack of consent by the Bank, the court was persuaded by the fact
"that the bank had never previously failed to consent to a re-
quested assignment.'3 6 The district court denied the Bank's mo-
tion for new trial,3 7 considering but not deciding whether the cer-
tificate was governed by the Florida Uniform Commercial Code,' 8
under which the Bank argued it had a right of set-off. The Bank
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, which, in turn, certified a series of questions of Florida law to
the Supreme Court of Florida.'
The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that the transaction
136. Id.
137. Id. (June 9, 1975) (order denying Bank's motion for new trial).
138. FLA. STAT. §§ 671.101-680.111 (1979).
139. The Fifth Circuit certified the following questions to the Supreme Court of
Florida:
I.
A. Is the assignment of the non-negotiable certificate of deposit as security
for the purchase of a bond a transfer entitled to secured transaction treatment
under Article 9 of the Florida Uniform Commercial Code, Fla.Stat.Ann. §§679.9-
101 et seq. (West 1966), and, if so
B. Is the transfer excluded from coverage under Article 9 by the provisions
of Fla.Stat.Ann. § 679.9-104(9) (West 1966) or Fla.Stat.Ann. § 679.9-104(11)
(West 1966)?
II. If Article 9 of the Florida Uniform Commercial Code covers this transaction
and the transfer is not excluded from the coverage:
A. Does Fla.Stat.Ann. § 679.9-318(4) (West 1966) invalidate the prohibi-
tion against assignment without the consent of the bank and the notation of the
assignment on the books?
B. Is the Bank's asserted right of set-off established by Fla.Stat.Ann. §
679.9-318(1) (West 1966)?
III. If Article 9 of the Florida Uniform Commercial Code does not cover this
transaction:
A. Is the prohibition against assignment without the consent of the Bank
valid and enforceable against Bornstein, thereby rendering the assignments
ineffective?
B. Is the "collateral transaction" rule of Coffin v. Talbot, 110 Fla. 131, 148
So. 184 (1933), and Nusbaum v. Riskin, 136 So.2d 1 (2d DCA Fla. 1961) still in
effect? If the "collateral transaction" rule is still in effect:
1. Is the Bank's asserted right of set-off defeated by it? or
2. Is the "collateral transaction" rule avoided by the creation of
a contractual right of set-off in the signature card which is not collat-
eral to but, rather, part of the purchase and issuance of the certifi-
cate of deposit?
C. Is the Bank entitled to set-off the funds represented by the certificate
of deposit if it has not changed its position in reliance on the deposit?
D. Is the Bank's asserted right to set-off defeated by its actual knowledge
of the attempted assignment transaction prior to the time the set-off was
consummated?
564 F.2d 721, 723 (5th Cir. 1977).
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was entitled to article 9 treatment.1 40 The court first characterized
the certificate as an "instrument" as defined in section
679.105(1)(g) of the Florida Statutes"" because such deposit certif-
icates evidenced a right to payment of money and were transferred
in the ordinary course of business by delivery with any necessary
endorsement or assignment. Although the written restrictions on
assignability made the Bank's promise to pay conditional, render-
ing the certificate nonnegotiable, 42 the court read the article 9 def-
inition as encompassing nonnegotiable instruments. 4 8 Article 9
thus applied to the transaction because the assignment of the cer-
tificate, a nonnegotiable instrument, was intended as security for
the bond purchase.1
44
The court next concluded that the assignment did not fall
within the exclusion from article 9 of transfers of "any deposit,
savings, passbook or like account."" Also inapplicable was the
similar exclusion of "any right of set-off,' 46 which the court inter-
preted to mean that the Bank, as claimant of a right to set-off,
need not comply with article 9 perfection requirements in order to
assert that right. "The section means simply that a right of set-off
may exist in a creditor who does not have a security interest.""
47
140. 374 So. 2d 6, 9 (Fla. 1979).
141. FLA. STAT. § 679.105(1)(g) (1977) (amended 1979) provides:
"Instrument" means a negotiable instrument (defined in s. 673.104), or a
security (defined in s. 678.102) or any other writing which evidences a right to
the payment of money and is not itself a security agreement or lease and is of a
type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with any
necessary endorsement or assignment.
142. 374 So. 2d at 13. The Bank argued that its conditional promise removed the certif-
icate from the article 9 definition, relying on cases which dealt with the negotiability of
instruments under § 673.104(1)(b).
143. 374 So. 2d at 9-10 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., 524 S.W.2d
525 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975)).
144. FLA. STAT. § 679.102(1)(a) (1977) (amended 1979) provides that article 9 applies
"[t]o any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest
in personal property or fixtures including goods, documents, instruments, general in-
tangibles, chattel paper, accounts or contract rights."
145. FLA. STAT. § 679.104(11) (1977) (amended 1979). The court referred to the 1972
revisions to the U.C.C., 374 So. 2d at 10, which were later adopted in Florida, effective
January 1, 1980. Section 679.104 was amended by the addition of subsection 12, which ex-
cludes from article 9 coverage the transfer of any interest in a "deposit account." The term
"deposit account" is defined in the amendments as a "demand, time, savings, passbook or
like account maintained with a bank, savings and loan association, credit union, or like or-
ganization, other than an account evidenced by a certificate of deposit." FLA. STAT. §
679.105(1)(e) (1979) (emphasis added). Thus, under the revisions, the court is clearly correct
that the certificate did not fall within this exclusion from article 9.
146. FLA. STAT. § 679.104(9) (1979).
147. 374 So. 2d at 10. The court quoted Professor Gilmore's remarks on the purpose of
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The Bank had argued that the certificate of deposit should be
classified as a "general intangible" or a "contract right," which
would in turn classify the Bank as an "account debtor.' 148 Under
section 679.318(1) of the Florida Statutes, Bornstein as assignee
would thus take the certificate subject to the Bank's right of set-
off, a claim or defense arising from the contract between account
debtor and assignor. 149 Because the court had already classified the
certificate as an "instrument" under the Code, it further concluded
that the Bank was not an account debtor and was not entitled to
preserve its set-off claim under that inapplicable section. 5 ' While
that holding seems adverse to the Bank at first blush, the court
further held that the certificate's printed prohibition against as-
signment without consent of the Bank was not invalidated by sub-
section 4 of the inapplicable account debtor statute.1"'
While adeptly handled, the court's analysis is not responsive
to the inquiry. The court advised that account debtor provisions
were inapplicable, that the set-off claim was not a security interest
requiring article 9 perfection, and that the Bank was not necessar-
ily precluded from asserting it against Bornstein."2s The court did
not, however, indicate which of the conflicting claims would have
priority, or whether article 9 would resolve the conflict at all.
this set-off exclusion from article 9:
This exclusion is an apt example of the absurdities which result when draftsmen
attempt to appease critics by putting into a statute something that is not in any
sense wicked but is hopelessly irrelevant. Of course a right of set-off is not a
security interest and has never been confused with one. The statute might as
appropriately exclude fan dancing.
G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 10.7, at 315-16 (1965), quoted in
374 So. 2d at 10 n.2.
148. 374 So. 2d at 10-11. FLA. STAT. § 679.105(1)(a) (1977) (amended 1979) defines "ac-
count debtor" as "the person who is obligated on an account, chattel paper, contract right or
general intangible."
149. FLA. STAT. § 679.318(1) (1979) provides that unless the account debtor has agreed
otherwise, the rights of an assignee are subject to "(a) [aIll the terms of the contract be-
tween the account debtor and assignor and any defense or claim arising therefrom; and (b)
[a]ny other defense or claim of the account debtor against the assignor which accrues before
the account debtor receives notification of the assignment."
150. 374 So. 2d at 11.
151. Id. FLA. STAT. § 679.318(4) (1977) (amended 1979) provides: "[a] term in any con-
tract between an account debtor and an assignor which prohibits assignment of an account
or contract right to which they are parties is ineffective."
152. 374 So. 2d at 10. While agreeing with the determination in Lone Star that the
certificate was a nonnegotiable instrument, see note 143 supra, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida rejected the Texas court's conclusion that no subsequent set-off claim by the issuing
bank could impair a security interest in a certificate of deposit perfected by possession. The
Lone Star certificate was classified a nonnegotiable instrument for lack of bearer or order
language, not because its assignability was restricted, as in Bornstein. 524 S.W.2d at 534.
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In anticipation of an adverse decision classifying the certificate
as an instrument, the Bank formulated an appealing but unsuc-
cessful counterargument. " If the certificate were a nonnegotiable
instrument, then section 673.805 of the Florida Statutes 154 made it
subject to all provisions of article 3 except those peculiar to a
holder in due course. Thus the "simple contract" defenses pro-
vided by section 673.306 of the Florida Statutes155 against one not
a holder in due course should be available to the Bank. These de-
fenses should be read as "incorporating" the account debtor de-
fenses of section 679.318(1), including the Bank's set-off claim.
Upon close scrutiny, the court rejected the Bank's reliance on
section 673.805 to bring the certificate of deposit within article 3,
because that section referred "to a particular type of instrument
which meets all requirements as to form of a negotiable instrument
except that it is not payable to order or to bearer."" This certifi-
cate also lacked negotiable form because it did not contain an un-
conditional promise to pay a sum certain in money: "[h]ere, in the
event of assignment, the promise to pay is conditioned upon con-
sent of the Bank and reflection of the assignment on the books of
the Bank. 1 57 Although adverse to the Bank's incorporation argu-
ment, this conclusion is tremendously significant because the court
tacitly recognized the validity of the proscription against assign-
ment provided on the certificate itself.
Because it concluded that article 9 covered the transaction,
the court did not reach the certified question whether, under Flor-
ida case law, the prohibition on the certificate rendered the assign-
ment to Bornstein ineffective. " But, as noted above, the court did
not explicitly indicate which party would prevail under article 9,
either.
With the foregoing answers in hand, the Fifth Circuit again
considered the case and, to the surprise of many, affirmed per
153. 374 So. 2d at 11-12.
154. FLA. STAT. § 673.805 (1979) provides: "This chapter applies to any instrument
whose terms do not preclude transfer and which is otherwise negotiable within this chapter
but which is not payable to order or to bearer, except that there can be no holder in due
course of such an instrument."
155. FLA. STAT. § 673.306 (1979) provides that a person who does not have the rights of
a holder in due course takes the instrument subject to "(1) [alll valid claims to it on the part
of any person; and (2) [a]ll defenses of any party which would be available in an action on a
simple contract."
156. 374 So. 2d at 12 (quoting U.C.C. § 3-805, Comment (1977 version)).
157. 374 So. 2d at 13; see note 142 and accompanying text supra.
158. See note 139 supra.
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curiam" 9 the district court judgment for Bornstein. Absent a writ-
ten opinion, one can only speculate why the Fifth Circuit ruled as
it did. Since the Supreme Court of Florida had advised that article
9 governed the priorities of the claimants to the certificate, the
task of the Fifth Circuit was to align those priorities under the
statute. While some courts have found the interest of a secured
party to be superior to that of a set-off claimant, the evolving rule
is that only a "valid prior claim" will defeat the right of set-off. °10
The Fifth Circuit was thus obligated to decide whether Bornstein's
interest was valid and, in doing so, it would have to consider the
Bank's proscription against assignment of the certificate. Either
the Fifth Circuit failed to make these determinations or it miscon-
strued the supreme court's opinion, from which it is abundantly
clear that the Bank's restriction against assignment was valid.
As a consequence of the Bornstein case the industry is in a
quandary: are certificates of deposit which restrict assignment non-
assignable? Until this issue is resolved by a written opinion, issuers
of certificates of deposit would be well advised to take possession
of certificates if they seek to secure obligations of their depositors
therewith. This result, of course, converts the right of set-off into a
security interest notwithstanding section 679.104(9) of the Florida
Statutes""1 and undermines the concept of set-off generally. For
the prudent issuer, however, there does not appear to be any viable
alternative.
IX. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
A. Uniform Commercial Code Revisions
Article 9 of the Florida Uniform Commercial Code was
amended in 1979, effective January 1, 1980.162 Although the
amendments were largely nonsubstantive and merely clarified the
former version, they do contain non-uniform revisions including
new filing rules.13
159. 606 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
160. First Wis. Nat'l Bank v. Midland Nat'l Bank, 76 Wis. 662, 251 N.W.2d 829 (1977);
see Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 235 (1966).
161. See note 147 and accompanying text supra.
162. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-398 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 679.302, .401, .403, .407(1) and
adding §§ 679.408, 680.108, .109 (1979)). The author of this survey co-authored the amend-
ments as well as the corresponding sponsors' notes.
163. A complete analysis of the amendments is beyond the scope of this article. For an
explanation of the amendments by the official sponsors of the legislation, see FLORIDA BAR
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COMM., SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER FLORIDA'S UNIFORM
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B. Preservation of Collateral
In a suit against the guarantor of an equipment purchase loan,
the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the lender
bank's failure to perfect a security interest granted by the default-
ing borrower justified a release of the guarantor to the extent he
was damaged. 64
The court concluded that "[ilt was incumbent upon the Bank
to take all normal precautions to perfect all security interest
[sic]."' It is arguable that the decision rested upon the fact that
the lender had "assurred the guarantor that it would cause the
necessary Uniform Commercial Code documents to be filed""'. . .
in order to perfect its security interest.1
67
C. Anticipatory Breach of Mortgage
In a foreclosure suit by a purchase money third mortgagee, the
Third District held that the mortgagor's statements that it did not
intend to make required payments on two senior mortgages and
that it was preparing to file bankruptcy proceedings constituted an
anticipatory breach of the senior mortgages, permitting the third
mortgagee to foreclose.18 This decision gives lenders a high degree
of protection, but it does so at the expense of the well-established
rule that there may be no anticipatory breach of a strictly unilat-
eral obligation merely to pay money in installments under a prom-
issory note.' sS
COMMERCIAL CODE INCLUDING THE RECENT REVISIONS EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 1980 app. A
(1979). See also Murray, Commercial Law, 1979 Developments in Florida Law, 34 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 499, 557-60 (1980).
164. Baitcher v. National Indus. Bank, 368 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
165. Id. at 440.
166. Id. at 439.
167. Although not discussed in the opinion, this result is consonant with FLA. STAT. §
673.606(1)(b) (1979), which provides that a holder discharges any party to a negotiable in-
strument to the extent that the holder "[ulnjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instru-
ment given by or on behalf of the party or any person against whom he has a right of
recourse."
168. Poinciana Hotel, Inc. v. Kasden, 370 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The foreclo-
sure suit was filed on the last day of a 10-day grace period for payment under the senior
mortgages, which were thus not technically in default. The purchase money mortgagee's
interest would have been destroyed if the senior mortgages had been defaulted and acceler-
ated, a fact the court considered heavily in countenancing the premature foreclosure filing.
The court noted that under FLA. STAT. § 671.208 (1979), the mortgagee could exercise the
acceleration clause if he believed in good faith that the prospect of payment was impaired,
although this point was not raised at trial. 370 So. 2d at 401 n.8.
169. 370 So. 2d at 402 (Schwartz, J., dissenting).
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D. Letters of Credit
In Fidelity National Bank v. Dade County,170 the Third Dis-
trict affirmed the well-established principle that a beneficiary of a
letter of credit must strictly comply with the terms of the credit
before it may demand payment thereunder. The court rejected the
beneficiary's argument that documents submitted to the issuer
when taken together constituted the certification required under
the credit. In addition, the court suggested that a letter of credit
"amounts to an offer by the issuer to purchase certain documents.
If those documents are not tendered, the offer is not accepted, and
the issuer is not bound.' 7' In applying this offer-acceptance analy-
sis to letters of credit, the court departs from the more traditional
view that a letter of credit is a binding agreement between the is-
suer and the' beneficiary. 172 The distinction between an offer and
an agreement in this context is not merely academic, since an offer
typically may be withdrawn, but an irrevocable letter of credit is
binding on the issuer as soon as the beneficiary is properly advised
that the credit has been issued.
7 8
In a suit by the renter of a safe deposit box for loss of its con-
tents, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, refused to en-
force an exculpatory clause in the rental agreement whereby the
bank attempted to disclaim its bailee relationship and any liability
for loss. 4 The bank argued that the clause also exonerated it from
losses resulting from unauthorized access to the box by the renter's
ex-wife. The court held the disclaimer ineffective against the ex-
press access limitations in the agreement, noting that acceptance
of this argument would render the agreement "entirely
nugatory.
''17
170. 371 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
171. Id. at 548.
172. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 995
(N.D. Ga. 1973); FLA. STAT. § 675.109(1) (1979).
173. FLA. STAT. § 675.106 (1979).
174. Sniffen v. Century Nat'l Bank, 375 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
175. Id. at 894.
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